John Tweddle, father of William Tweddle, agreed with William Guy to pay William Tweddle £100 after marrying his daughter. The written agreement contained a clause which specifically granted William Tweddle the power to sue for enforcement of the agreement. William Guy died, and the estate would not pay and William Tweddle sued.
- Does William Tweddle have standing to sue for enforcement of the contract?
Judgment for the defendant.
Wightman held that there was precedent that a stranger to the consideration of a promise can still have an action if the relationship is close enough (Bourne v Mason, 1669). Despite this precedent, he maintains that the current position is that no stranger to the consideration can take action, even if it was for his benefit.
Crompton examines whether there was consideration from the son and holds that natural love and affection (from the marriage) was not sufficient consideration. This is in contrast to Provender where the governing ethic was honour; here the governing paradigm is exchange and reciprocity. Crompton further says it would be "a monstrous proposition" if an individual would be able to sue for a contract but not be able to be sued under it.
Blackburn deals with an agency argument that natural love and affection trickles from the father to the son and this entitles son to sue in his father's place (as if he had provided the consideration). Blackburn holds that the cases say that natural love and affection are not sufficient consideration for an action.
- Third parties to a contract do not derive any rights from that agreement nor are they subject to any burdens imposed by it.
- Natural love and affection is not sufficient consideration in the eyes of the law.